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EVI and its Use 
Design of an Economic Vulnerability Index  
and its Use  for International Development Policy1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
As an answer to a need expressed by the UN General Assembly an Economic 
Vulnerability Index (EVI) has been defined by the Committee for Development Policy. The 
present paper, which refers to this index, first examines how a structural economic 
vulnerability index can be designed, in particular for low income countries: it recalls the 
conceptual and empirical grounds of such an index, considers the structure of the present EVI, 
its sensitivity to methodological choices about averaging, as well as related possible 
improvements, and briefly compares levels and trends of EVI in various groups of countries, 
using a new data base of a "retrospective EVI".  
In a second part the paper examines how EVI can be used for international 
development policy, underlining two main purposes. The first one, for which EVI has been 
initially designed at the UN, is the identification of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 
allowed to receive some preferential treatment in aid and trade matters:  EVI is, with income 
per capita and human capital, one of the three complementary criteria a country needs to 
meet to be included into the list of LDCs and consequently cannot be considered alone to 
avoid a graduation from the list. A second use would be to retain EVI as a criterion for aid 
allocation between developing countries, besides other and traditional criteria: we argue that 
such an inclusion is legitimate both for effectiveness and equity reasons. These two purposes 
are presented as complementary. 
 
Key words: vulnerability, instability, shocks, exposure, resilience, structural handicap, 
growth, least developed countries, aid effectiveness, aid allocation. 
                                                      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
  This paper presented at the opening session of the UNU WIDER Conference on Fragile 
States-Fragile Groups, Helsinki, June 2007, relies on a research done by the author in 
collaboration of the UN DESA and leading to a forthcoming book on the Least Developed 
Countries (Guillaumont 2007a). Special acknowledgement is due for the tables to Martine 
Bouchut at CERDI and Charles Milenko at UN DESA. 
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Economic vulnerability of developing countries is not really a new issue. If we 
consider the development literature of forty years ago, the issue of instability, especially for 
primary exports and international prices, held a significant part in the analysis of the problems 
faced by developing countries. Recently the economic vulnerability of developing countries 
has appeared to be high again on the international agenda.   
 
 Several trends and events may have contributed to explain this renewed interest on 
macro vulnerability in the last decade. The unsustainability of growth episodes in Africa has 
become a major intellectual and political challenge. In particular the problem of conflicts, 
acute in Africa, has drawn the attention of the international community on the risk of civil 
wars, often durable or recurrent: it is mainly in reference to these situations and other possible 
sources of collapse that new concepts have emerged, such as "LICUS" (low income countries 
under stress) or “fragile states”, although these concepts significantly differ from the 
economic vunerability, as it will appear below. Moreover, in the second part of the nineties, 
the “Asian crisis” has underlined the vulnerability of some emerging countries, which before 
the crisis registered a high level of capital inflows with a weak financial structure: it led 
several authors to assess the risk of a financial crisis, which is a measure of vulnerability, but 
also differ from the vulnerability of low income countries considered below. To be also noted 
the concern about the instability of international commodity prices has become deeper due to 
their possibly higher impact on producers in a context of liberalized domestic agricultural 
markets: initiatives have been taken to make proposals on the ways by which commodity 
dependent economies can manage the risks they face in a market based approach. And more 
generally the attention brought to vulnerability at the household level, which has emerged 
from the huge amount of work on poverty, has also reinforced the interest on vulnerability at 
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the macro level, since vulnerability of households results to a large extent from macro 
vulnerability. 
 
       Two main factors have not only contributed to the growing concern about macro 
vulnerability, but also led to look for an index of vulnerability, comparable across countries 
and likely to be used for the design of international development policies. They correspond to 
an international concern about the structural features of specific groups of countries, 
expressed in various UN meetings and resolutions. Two groups of countries thus have been 
considered with regard to their vulnerability. The first one, and the only official one, is the 
group belonging to the category of the “Least Developed Countries” (LDCs), set up by the 
UN General Assembly in 1971. The second, a more informal one, is the group of “Small 
Island Developing States” (SIDS). For both groups the need has been expressed to assess the 
vulnerability of the belonging countries through an appropriate indicator. 
 
 First the small island developing states (SIDS) have repeatedly expressed a concern 
about their level of vulnerability, as evidenced in 1994 at the Barbados Conference on 
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States. Following this Conference 
which asked for « the development of vulnerability indices and other indicators that reflect the 
status of small island developing countries and integrate ecological fragility and economic 
vulnerability », the United Nations General Assembly, in 1996, requested the Secretary 
General to prepare a report on the vulnerability index and the Committee for Development 
Planning (CDP) to examine this index. In 1998, the UN Commission on Sustainable 
Development urged the CDP to present its conclusion and other UN bodies to accord priority 
to work on vulnerability of SIDS. In 1999 the Committee for Development Policy (new name 
of the CDP), after considering several available indicators proposed a new and relatively 
simple index (United Nations 1999), elaborated further at the following sessions of the CDP, 
as explained below. Ten years after the Barbados Conference, the Mauritius Conference 
(December 2004) reiterated the concern of the international community about the 
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vulnerability of small islands. Few days later, the tsunami evidenced the relevance of this 
concern. 
 
 Second, in accordance with the own suggestions of the CDP, the General Assembly 
requested this Committee to consider “the usefulness of the vulnerability index as a criterion 
for the designation of the Least Developed Countries” (LDCs). Since the origin of the 
category the LDCs have been designed as low income countries suffering from structural 
handicap to growth. Besides the level of their income per capita, the criteria used to capture 
structural handicaps were initially the literacy rate and the share of manufacturing in GDP. 
They have been replaced in 1991 by two composite indices, one referring to human status, the 
other to economic diversification. In 1999, as noted above, a new “economic vulnerability 
index” (EVI) was considered by the CDP to replace the index of diversification as one of the 
criteria to be used for the identification of LDCs, in addition to the other two criteria (the level 
of GDP per capita and an index of human capital).  The CDP, in 2000 in its triennial review 
of the list of LDCs did implement the EVI index as an identification criterion. It did it again 
in 2003 and 2006, after revising the index, slightly in 2002, more deeply in 2005. This new 
vulnerability criterion, initial and revised, has been acknowledged by ECOSOC . 
 
 The economic vulnerability of a country can be defined by the risk for (poor) countries 
to see their development hampered by the shocks they face, natural or external. There are two 
main kinds of exogenous shocks, then two main sources of vulnerability: 1) environmental or 
“natural” shocks, namely natural disasters, such as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, and the 
more frequent climatic shocks, such as typhoons and hurricanes, droughts, floods, etc. ; 2) 
external (trade and exchange related) shocks, such as slumps in external demand, world 
commodity prices instability (and correlated instability of terms of trade), international 
fluctuations of interest rates, etc. Other domestic shocks may also be generated by political 
instability, or more generally by unforeseen political changes. These shocks however are not 
considered here, as far as they seem less “exogenous”. 
 
            Vulnerability can be seen as the result of three components: (a) the size and frequency 
of the exogenous shocks, either observed (ex post vulnerability) or anticipated (ex ante 
vulnerability); (b) the exposure to the shocks ; (c) the capacity to react to the shocks, or  
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“resilience”2. The resilience is more dependent on the current policy, more easily reversible, 
less structural. But there may also be a structural element in the resilience component of 
vulnerability. 
 
 A distinction thus can be made between structural vulnerability, which results from 
factors that are durably independent from the current political will of countries, and the 
vulnerability deriving from policy, which results from present choices. For instance, the 
vulnerability of the Asian countries in the mid nineties, after the 1997 crisis, is very different 
from the vulnerability of small economies which export raw materials or of small islands. It is 
less structural, more the result of policy, more transient. This feature is clearly evidenced 
when vulnerability is measured by the probability of a financial crisis, estimated mainly from 
financial and policy variables (see for instance Berg and Patillo, 1999, Goldstein et al. 2000). 
If a vulnerability index is to be used for selecting certain countries and providing them with a 
durable support by the international community, the vulnerability to be measured is the 
structural one, which essentially results from the size of the shocks that can arise and the 
exposure to such shocks. 
 
               It also follows that structural economic vulnerability should be clearly distinguished 
from state fragility.  As evidenced in several papers presented azt the WIDER conference, 
fragile states, as were the LICUS, are defined with regard to policy indicators, essentially the 
CPIA (Country policy and Institutional Assessment) of the World Bank:  they are (developing, 
sometimes only low income) countries with a (very) low policy score3.  Of course many 
countries may meet both the criteria of structural vulnerability and state fragility, due to the 
likely influence of the former on the latter, but the two concepts rely on opposite grounds, 
structural versus policy factors, and cannot be used by the same way to design international 
policies, as we shall see below for aid policies (see below footnote 24). 
 
                                                 
2
 The concept of resilience is largely used in some works more specifically oriented towards the environmental 
or natural sources of vulnerability (cf. Kaly et al. 1998). A distinction close to the previous one can be found in 
Rodrik (1999) who, looking for the risk of social conflict in countries facing external shocks, considered 
separately the severity of the shocks, the depth of latent social conflict (likely to increase the impact of the 
shocks), and the quality of conflict management institutions. 
3
 for instance belonging to the bottom two quintiles of the CPIA or with no CPIA for the Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD. 
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 Another distinction should finally be done for the purpose of this paper between 
economic vulnerability and ecological fragility. The United Nations initial concern about 
vulnerability included both economic vulnerability and ecological fragility. It rapidly became 
clear that the two notions should be analysed separately. For instance, losses in biodiversity 
reflect ecological fragility and are not necessarily major elements of economic vulnerability. 
The ad hoc expert group commissioned by the UN on vulnerability clearly recognized this 
difference (which was reaffirmed by the CDP), while also acknowledging that economic 
vulnerability could be induced by natural factors, let us say by the environment ("the relative 
susceptibility of economies to damage caused by natural disasters"). So environmentally 
induced economic vulnerability can be considered either as economic vulnerability or as 
ecological vulnerability 4.  
 
          It is clearly an index of structural economic vulnerability which has been designed by 
the CDP with the EVI and which is considered here: it relates to structural factors, beyond the 
present will of the country, not to policy factors, which also influence the global vulnerability, 
mainly through resilience. EVI has been designed to identify among low income countries 
those suffering the most from structural handicaps to growth. 
 
           It should be noted that, to be used for LDCs identification, EVI is measured for a larger 
set of countries than the LDCs group, not only other low income countries, but also middle 
income ones. Thus it is conceivable to use it for other purposes, where the measurement of 
this structural handicap would appear useful. We argue that it is noticeably the case in the 
search for relevant aid allocation criteria. 
 
 In the next sections of this paper we consider successively two issues: 
- how can a structural economic vulnerability index be designed, in particular for low 
income countries? And it has been done by the CDP? 
- how can such an economic vulnerability index be used  for international development 
policy, and in particular  for LDCs identification and for aid allocation? 
                                                 
4
 A comprehensive attempt to build an "environmental vulnerability index" was undertaken by SOPAC (South Pacific 
Applied Geoscience Commission), cf Kaly and alii, 1999. In May 1999, the CDP considered several available indicators (the 
Commonwealth Secretariat composite vulnerability index, the Caribbean Bank economic vulnerability index and the SOPAC 
environmental vulnerability index), before proposing to build a new and relatively simple index of economic vulnerability 
(United Nations, 1999). In 2000, assessing the implementation of the outcome of the Barbados Conference, the GA 
(A/55/185) presented its own review of the several attempts to build a vulnerability index "for small island developing 
states", a review to a large extent focused on environmental issues 
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1- Designing a structural economic vulnerability index, with particular reference to the 
UN CDP index 
 
In this section we consider successively four issues: 
• the conceptual and empirical basis of an EVI 
•  the structure of the present EVI 
•  the sensitivity to methodological choices 
•  some levels and trends, using for the latter a "retrospective EVI" 
 
1.1. Conceptual and empirical basis 
 
Let us very briefly summarize the reasons why economic vulnerability is detrimental 
to development (for a review, see Guillaumont 2006). We refer to a dynamic definition of 
vulnerability, the risk of economic growth to be markedly and durably reduced by shocks).  
Another dynamic definition, somewhat broader, is the likelihood of negative and durable 
effects of shocks on poverty reduction. 
  
        We examine the links between vulnerability and growth referring to the three main 
components of vulnerability identified above (shocks, exposure and resilience), then add 
some few words on the direct effects on poverty.  
   
 Shocks: the Negative Impact of Instability on Growth 
 
 There is no much debate about the negative impact of “one side” natural negative 
shocks such as earthquakes, typhoons or floods. The damage caused by these events is often 
huge, first by the number of deaths, second by the destruction of physical capital. The debate 
is rather about the measurement of the size of these losses. Many shocks are “two sided” (up 
and down and again…), in particular external ones. It is the very nature of instability to be a 
succession of booms and slumps (of export prices, external demand, rainfalls …). This is why 
to assess vulnerability on a long period it is appropriate to consider the impact of instability or 
volatility rather than the impact of separate shocks. The impact of these successive “up and 
down” is not neutral,  resulting either from an asymmetry of ex post reaction to positive and 
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negative shocks or from the uncertainty generated by their previous succession. Thus, there 
are both ex post and ex ante effects of instability (as clearly underlined by Gunning 2004). 
Most measures used in cross section literature rather rely on ex post concepts. 
          
 Some empirical studies offer a test of the macro vulnerability, considering the 
instability of growth but not specifically and separately its main sources. For instance Ramey 
and Ramey (1995) they show a significant link between the instability of the rate of economic 
growth and the average rate of growth it self  (exogeneity of the instability tested). But this 
instability can be due to structural factors and to policy factors as well, a reason why the 
volatility of growth cannot be an approximate indicator of structural vulnerability (cf. infra) . 
The same remark applies to the recent and systematic attempt to assess the link between 
output volatility and growth due to Hnathovska and Loayza (2004). Both studies do not assess 
the impact of structural vulnerability as such. 
 
The effects of export instability, a main source of structural vulnerability in 
developing countries, have been discussed for many years in the literature using growth 
regressions. There seems to be now a consensus emerging from several studies to conclude 
that export instability (or in some studies terms of trade instability) has a negative effect on 
growth 5. More significant  effects are found when the studies test simultaneously the (positive) 
effect of export growth, and the (negative) effect of export instability and when the export 
instability (size of the shocks) is either weighted by the average export to GDP ratio during 
the period (Guillaumont 1994, Combes and Guillaumont 2002), a ratio which is ceteris 
paribus the higher the lower the population size, or is an instability of the export to GDP ratio 
itself (Dawe 1996): the exposure to the shocks is thus taken into account. 
 
Export earnings instability is not the only kind of instability the effects of which have 
been tested. We have previously estimated the influence of several primary instabilities, 
mainly exogenous, on the rate of growth and argued that these instabilities, significantly 
higher in South of the Sahara Africa than in other developing countries, may have been a 
major factor of the slow rate of growth in Sub-Saharan Africa during the seventies and 
eighties, since here on average these instabilities appear to have been higher than in other 
                                                 
5
 See for instance Bleany and Greenaway 2001, Glezakos 1984, Gyimah-Brempong 1991, Fosu 1992, 2001 Guillaumont 
1994, Lutz 1994, Dawe 1996, Guillaumont et al. 1999, Combes and Guillaumont, 2002, Mendoza 2000 and the review of the 
literature by Araujo Bonjean et al. 1999   
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developing countries (Guillaumont et al.1999). They are the instability of the terms of trade, 
weighted by the average export to GDP ratio, or that of the real value of exports, weighted in 
the same way, the instability of the agricultural value added (weighted by the average share of 
agricultural value added in GDP) and political instability. The first and the third instabilities 
appeared to have a significant effect on growth, but not that of the agricultural value added. 
However in another work both the instabilities of real value of exports and of agricultural 
value added, here unweighted, appear to be significant (Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001). 
Recently Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) have evidenced the impact of rainfall 
variations on growth in African countries during 1981-1999 and followingly on the likelihood 
of the civil conflict.6 
 
The effects of primary instabilities affect more the rate of change in factor productivity 
than the level of investment. They are channelled to growth through intermediate economic 
instabilities (Guillaumont et al. 1999), namely the instability of the rate of investment and that 
of the relative prices. These two intermediate instabilities have negative effects on growth and 
are related to policy, which by this way is weakened by structural vulnerability. First, the 
instability of the rate of investment is a factor, curiously neglected in the literature, of lower 
average capital productivity: as a result of the declining marginal productivity of investment, 
the gain in total output due to a high level of investment is less than the loss due to a low level 
of investment. This effect, illustrated during the boom periods by the projects oversized, 
under prepared and weakly productive, mainly concerns public investment..The second, 
intermediate instability, that of the relative prices, proxied by the instability of the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) also appear to have a strong negative effect on the rate of 
growth. It is assumed to blur the market signals and induce a misallocation of investment. 
This negative effect of the REER instability or volatility has also been evidenced in several 
papers (Aizenman and Marion 1999, Ghura and Grennes 1993, Serven 1997, Guillaumont et 
al. 1999). 
 
 Either due to the macro policy through REER instability or to the passing through to 
farmers of world agricultural prices fluctuations, the instability of the real producer prices is 
generally considered as a factor of a lower average agricultural output, noticeably by its 
effects on the adoption of new techniques, as does the weather risk (Newbery and Stiglitz 
                                                 
6
 Actually the aim of this paper is to test the impact of negative growth shocks on the like hood of civil conflict, and only use 
rainfall variations as an instrumental variable for economic growth. 
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1981, and United Nations 2001b for a review of studies on the impact of risk on agricultural 
productivity).  At a macro level the effects of the real producer prices instability on the 
growth of agricultural production have also been significantly tested from a sample pooling 
several products in many countries (Guillaumont and Combes 1996, Boussard and Gérard 
1996, and as to the effects of real border prices instability, Subervie 2006). 
  
 Thus it seems that external instability has negative effects through the instability of the 
rate of investment and that of the real exchange rate, either by its impact on public finance 
when retained at the government level or by its impact at the producer level when passed 
through to producers. 
 
Instability is also channelled to growth through political instability. The primary 
instabilities, and the induced intermediate ones, are a factor of political instability and civil 
war, and through these events,  also a significant factor of lower growth. The instability of 
exports, all the higher that exports are primary, exacerbates the frustration feelings. When the 
instability of exports, weighted by the openness rate is introduced in a conflict occurrence 
model à la Collier- Hoeffler (2004), not only the coefficient of determination significantly 
increases, but also the share of primary commodities in exports becomes unsignificant 
(Guillaumont et al. 2005). Other exogeneous shocks may have  similar effects on the risk of 
conflict:  Miguel, Satyanatah and Sergenti (2004), examining the impact of civil war on 
growth, instrument civil war by rainfall instability which then appears to be a significant 
factor of it. 
 
An impact of shocks depending on exposure: major influence of country size.  
  
The main structural factor of a greater exposure to exogenous shocks is of course the 
smallness of a country. Among several ways by which the size of a country can be measured, 
the most meaningful is the number of inhabitants. In some cases (possibly for natural shocks) 
the area smallness could be a more relevant measure of the exposure to the shocks. But to 
assess the main economic consequences of the size of a country, independently from its 
income per capita, the most usual measure is the number of its population. 
 
The vulnerability issue meets the old and renewed debate on the consequences of the 
size of nations (see recent works of Alesina and Spolaore 2004 and Winters and Martins 
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2004). Of course country size has many consequences, all of them at first glance not related to 
vulnerability, in particular scale economies in many sectors of activity, industry as well as 
government (the unit costs of public administration are expected to be higher in smaller 
countries). However, when investigating the channels by which size matters for development, 
links with vulnerability more clearly appear. There are at least three main channels (or 
intermediate variables) through which small size influences the exposure components of 
vulnerability: trade intensity, government size and social cohesion. 
 
Take first the exposure to external shocks, well reflected by the export to GDP ratio. 
The smaller the (population) size, the higher (ceteris paribus) the trade to GDP ratio is (and 
the more “dependent” the economy).  Country size is the main structural factor determining 
the trade to GDP ratio, then the main determinant of the “natural openness” and the main 
factor to be neutralized if an index of “openness policy” is drawn from the observed ratios 
(Guillaumont 1989, 1994). It is clear that the impact of a given export shortfall is higher, the 
larger the share of export in GDP. For that reason the trade to GDP ratio, then the main 
determinant of the “natural openness” and the main factor to be neutralized if an index of 
“openness policy” is drawn from the observed ratios (Guillaumont 1989, 1994). It is clear that 
the impact of a given export shortfall is higher, the larger the share of export in GDP. For that 
reason the impact of export instability (and of export growth as well) is better estimated when 
the export instability variable (export growth as well) is multiplied by the export to GDP ratio, 
i.e. when it is a “weighted” instability7.8 
 
Moreover diseconomies of scale associated to smallness result in a stronger difficulty 
to diversify at low cost. As a consequence small low income countries face a higher risk than 
larger countries to implement inefficient or costly policies when they adopt protectionist 
measures; for the same reason a protectionist trend at the world level is likely to be more 
damaging for small countries. Alesina and Spolaore (2004) have tested such an effect in a 
cross-section growth regression through a multiplicative variable of the (log of) population 
and openness: the coefficient of this multiplicative variable is found significantly negative, 
                                                 
7
 While natural openness, mainly determined by smallness, increases the exposure to trade shocks and consequently their 
negative effect on growth, openness policy is not only a positive factor of growth, but also a factor of greater resilience 
(Guillaumont 1994, Combes and Guillaumont 2002). 
8
 Let us add that with regard to natural shocks or disasters, as far as they generally concern some specific groups of the 
population, the larger the population, the smaller the aggregate exposure: in a large country, climatic shocks are likely to 
affect only a small part of the population. 
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while that of each of two variables added independently in the regression is significantly 
positive. 
 
Another reason why smallness is thought to be a factor of lower growth is its assumed 
impact on the size of government. The assumption of a (negative) relationship between 
(population) size and the relative size of government activities has been successfully tested by 
Alesina and Spolaore (2004). An interpretation can be found in a previous work by Rodrik 
(1998) who argue that high trade to GDP ratio (itself related to the population size) leads to an 
extension of the role of state in order to provide more insurance to the citizens. Or this 
relationship can be linked to a stronger effect of public revenue instability on public 
consumption. If a large size of government activities is a source of higher costs, there may be 
again a source of vulnerability due to smallness, likely to lower growth. 
 
A third channel by which the country (population) size may impact vulnerability and 
growth is through social cohesion. It could be an advantage of smallness to allow more social 
cohesion (less ethnic, linguistic or religion fragmentation): if social fragmentation is a 
negative factor of growth and if fragmentation increases with population size, smallness is an 
advantage not an handicap. To be noted fragmentation, as a handicap, is not unrelated to 
vulnerability: one reason why it is assumed to negatively impact growth is that this structural 
factor influences the exposure or the resilience to the shocks (Rodrik, 1999). The reality may 
be more complex, and several works evidence non-linear relationships where linear ones are 
assumed. In particular rather than social fragmentation social polarization may be a handicap 
(and a factor of vulnerability) (Arcand et al. 2002), and polarization does not increase with 
population size: it (at least beyond a low threshold) rather decreases with it9. Also for that 
reason smallness may appear to enhance and not lower vulnerability.10 
 
Anyway it clearly appears from several cross-country regressions that when 
appropriate control variables are used the (log of) population size is a significant positive 
factor of growth ( Alesina and Spolaore 2004, Bosworth and Collins, 2003, Guillaumont and 
Guillaumont 1988, Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001, Millner and Weyman-Jones 2003) and a 
                                                 
9
 Even the assumption of a negative correlation between population size and other linguistic fragmentation is debatable: when 
fragmentation is explained both by the population size and the surface, the coefficient of population size is significantly 
negative, while that of surface is (significantly) positive. Since the absolute value of the coefficients are similar, it means that 
fragmentation decreases with population density (internal work in process at CERDI). 
10
 The greater social cohesion of small islands is also debated by Helleiner (1996). 
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negative factor of export instability (Easterly and Kraay 2000). That smallness lowers growth 
may be due either to higher vulnerability or to scale diseconomies or to their conjunction. 
 
   Besides smallness of population size, other factors of exposure to shocks are to be 
considered. They are related to the structure of the economy and to the location of the country, 
primary economies and remote countries being more exposed to external and natural shocks. 
The extent to which they are so are examined below, with the indicators of exposure. Here let 
us note that, as smallness, remoteness is a structural handicap not only because it is a factor of 
vulnerability11: even if transport costs have decreased, distance remains an important obstacle 
to trade (Brun et al.1999, 2005, Carrère and Schiff 2005). 
 
More on poverty effects of structural vulnerability 
 
 Instability by lowering growth has deleterious consequences on the pace of poverty 
reduction. It also has direct social effects independently of its effects on growth. Two reasons 
make these direct effects likely. One is the feeling of frustration generated by a shortfall of 
income following a rapid expansion which creates new needs and exaggerated expectations, 
as illustrated above by the risk of civil war or of crime. The other reason is due to poverty 
traps, linked to the asymmetry of reactions of health, education, employment to income 
fluctuations. As far as instability lowers growth, it indeed slows down poverty reduction 
normally expected from growth, but also results in an anti-poor bias for a given average rate 
of growth. 
  
           First, instability of income lowers child survival. Probably the best single indicator of 
the evolution of the social situation in low income countries is the child mortality under five, 
as made available by the Demographic and Health Surveys and extended by the WHO. Child 
mortality is a very sensitive indicator, likely to reflect the strong asymmetric effect which can 
be expected from income instability: if a rise in mortality results from an income shortfall, it 
will not be compensated afterwards by equal income increase…. Also, due to the existence of 
a lower limit to child mortality, the best functional form, where the dependent variable is 
expressed as a logit (Grigoriou 2004), implies fofor the relevant range of mortality values an 
                                                 
11
 The relevance of remoteness for vulnerability has been underlined by Encontre (1999) 
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asymmetry in the up and down effects of income variations. Tested in GMM, with 
observations every five years from 1980 to 2000, the effect of previous income instability on 
child survival appears to be significantly negative (Guillaumont 2006, Guillaumont, 
Korachais and Subervie 2006). 
 
          Second, instability of income slows down poverty reduction. When we introduce the 
macro vulnerability concern in the burgeoning cross country research on the determinants of 
the level and evolution of poverty, made feasible by the extension of comparable set of data at 
the World Bank, it appears as a neglected factor. Main concern has been until now to assess 
the growth and inequality elasticities of poverty (good recent illustration in Adams 2004), but 
without similar concern for the effects of income instability on poverty reduction 
(S.Guillaumont Jeanneney and Kpodar 2004 however examined the effects of financial 
instability on poverty). A reasonable assumption however is that an instability of income 
pushes people in poverty traps ( poor people contracting health handicaps, children leaving 
the school, workers staying out of the labour market,…), so that the poverty reaction to a rise 
of average income is less than its reaction to a fall (see for instance in the context of Latin 
America de Janvry and Sadoulet 2000). This effect is expected to lower the absolute level of 
the average growth elasticity of poverty, and/or to increase poverty independently of income 
growth and inequality change: the instability of income must then be introduced both 
additively and multiplicatively with income growth. Measuring poverty change through the 
log of the headcount index of poverty on a sample of ten year spells and controlling for the 
rate of growth of income per capita and initial level of poverty, we obtain significant 
coefficients for the impact of income instability on poverty. This effect correspond to an 
increase in inequality which is captured only partially by the change in the Gini coefficient 
(another control variable) 12 .We must not forget that besides this direct impact growth 
volatility lowers the average rate of growth. Indeed and stability is good for growth, which 
“good for the poor”, but also stability makes growth better for the poor. Stability of growth 
makes it pro-poor (Guillaumont 2006, Guillaumont and Korachais 2006). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Consistently with the idea that instability increases inequality, as found by Breen and Garcia-Penalosa (2005). 
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1.2. Structure of the present EVI 
 
 The Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI), is the composite index which has been set 
up and applied by the CDP in 2000 as a criterion for LDCs identification, applied again in 
2003, then in 2006 (United Nations 2000, 2003, 2006). Minor and major revisions 
respectively occurred before these two last triennial reviews of the list of LDCs (see United 
Nations 2005, and our recommendations presented in 2004a, 2004b, 2006). The present 
(revised) EVI is a composite index calculated from seven component indices, four of which 
are shock indices, and three other ones exposure indices. Using an arithmetic averaging, equal 
weight is given to the total of shock indices and to the total of exposure indices. In shock 
indices equal weight is given to natural and external shocks. In exposure indices equal weight 
is given to population size and to the total of other indices. Of course, there are several other 
ways, possibly more logical, by which these component indices can be weighted and averaged 
(Guillaumont 2006, 2007), but the way used for EVI by the CDP has been chosen for reasons 
of simplicity and transparency.  
   
 We are considering a composite index13 rather than a single one such as the growth 
volatility, which has been used in many econometric works. The volatility or instability of the 
rate of growth of income (per capita) reflects ex post a macro economic instability which does 
depend on exogeneous shocks and structural factors of exposure, but also on policy factors, 
either as a reaction to the shocks or as autonomous policy shocks. There is a clear empirical 
evidence of the influence of policy factors on growth volatility (Easterly et al.2001, Combes 
et al. 2000) 14. For that reason growth rate volatility cannot be considered as a good synthetic 
indicator of structural vulnerability. Moreover the negative impact of shocks on growth does 
not necessarily involve growth instability, if costly insurance or compensatory mechanisms 
are at work. 
 
            The components of the EVI have been retained so that  they reflect the main channels 
through which structural vulnerability affects growth potential.  
                                                 
13
 There are in the literature several previous attempts to propose a composite indicator of economic 
vulnerability, in particular Briguglio (1995) ,Atkins et al (1998), Crowards (1999) reviewed elsewhere in United 
Nations 1999, Guillaumont 2007, for instance, but not corresponding to our concept of structural vulnerability. 
14
 For instance, Easterly et al. 2001 have stressed the negative effect (up to a point) of financial depth and the positive effect 
of openness on volatility. More specifically, concerning the effects of openness, Combes et al. 2000 find first that structural 
vulnerability (depending on structural factors, including population size) makes growth more unstable, whereas outward 
looking policy makes it more stable. Bleaney and Fielding 2002 also examine the impact of the exchange rate regime on 
output volatility, beside that of exogenous factors such as the instability of the terms of trade. 
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Natural and trade shocks 
 
  Climatic and other natural shocks are a main source of vulnerability in many 
developing countries and cover a large variety of events: earthquakes, typhoons or hurricanes, 
floods, droughts, insects’ invasions, etc. An indicator of the risk of natural catastrophes might 
be the frequency of such events, measured over a long period of time. But as evidenced by the 
recent Asian tsunami, the most severe and exceptional events do not correspond to any 
measurable probability. The potential negative impact of these very different events differs 
from one to the other, and even within one kind of event. Measuring the economic losses 
resulting from these events in all the developing countries concerned seems to be an 
impossible task. Taking the number of people affected, if it is known, seems to be a better 
approach, but people may be more or less severely affected.  Indicators of the average 
proportion of the population affected by these events can be used, specific to the way by 
which the population is affected (killed, displaced …))15 . The percentage of population 
displaced due to natural disasters (homeless index) has been retained as a component of EVI 
only from 2003, when comparable data appeared available. 
 
 Due to this problem of data and to the fact not all natural shocks (as for instance 
recurrent droughts in Sahelian countries) were registered as “disasters” another proxy had to 
be looked for. It was found in the instability of agricultural production measured with regard 
to its trend value. Whereas the trend of agricultural production may be supposed to mainly 
depend on the economic policy pursued and on permanent factors, the fluctuations around the 
trend may be supposed to reflect the occurrence and severity of natural shocks, because they 
are likely to affect agricultural production16. For these reasons this indicator was retained as a 
component of the EVI. 
 
                                                 
15
 The main source of the data is the Emergency Events Data base, compiled by the Center for Research on Epidemiology of 
Disaster (CRED) at the School of Public Health, Université Catholique de Louvain, data also given and supplemented in the 
IRC annual World Disasters Report. Relying on these data, a picture of natural disasters in each LDCs can be found in 
UNDP (2001). A previous use of such data for the measurement of vulnerability may be found in Atkins et al. 1998. 
16
 We used this indicator in several previous works (cf. for instance Guillaumont P. and S. 1988, Guillaumont, Guillaumont 
Jeanneney and Brun 1999).  
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 The previous two measures of natural shocks, which are not correlated, are only 
complementary proxies of the size of the natural shocks likely to affect growth prospects 
(likely to be aggregated by a single average in an index of natural shocks). They give a picture 
of the average size of past shocks which is only a proxy of the risk of similar future shocks. 
The risk of the most severe or exceptional natural shocks, such as the December 2004 Asian 
tsunami, cannot be captured ex ante by any index of likelihood of the shock. It can only be 
reflected ex post in the measures here presented, and more as a durable damage, i.e. a 
structural handicap, than as a risk. This difficulty leads to give more attention to exposure 
indices. 
 
 Another caveat is needed. Instability indices are related to a trend or to an average 
level. Trends, even if to some extent predictable, can also reflect a structural handicap (e.g. a 
declining rainfall level or a rising sea level). But they are not presently retained as a 
component of EVI. 
 
An indicator of trade shocks is given by the instability of the real export proceeds 
around its trend. It has to be applied to the total exports of goods and services: shocks affect 
service exports as well good exports, and often service exports are a large part of total export 
receipts in small (developing) countries. Some private transfers, such as migrant remittances, 
could also be included. It is assumed that for small countries this instability is structural, 
resulting from exogenous events, namely fluctuations in world prices, in external demand and 
in domestic events (for instance climatic shocks) not related to policy. Of course, some 
fluctuations of the export volume with regard to its trend may be due to the instability of the 
policy itself, but it can be supposed that policy influences more the trend than the fluctuations 
of the export volume.17 However the trend in the terms of trade seems to a large extent out of 
control of the country: when it is deteriorating (as when the sea level is rising), it may be a 
                                                 
17
           The use of instability indices as components of a vulnerability indicator raisExposure to shock indicators are of particular ies 
measurement problems. Instability is always relative to a reference or trend value. It is measured, for instance, by the average absolute 
deviation rom the reference or the trend value, or more often, by the variance of this deviation. A critical issue is then the choice of this 
reference value, in particular the estimation of the trend. A deterministic trend has long been assumed (for instance, in the literature on 
export instability) , what was often inappropriate due to the possibility of non stationarity of the series. Since on the other hand the series 
may not be purely stochastic, the reference value can be conveniently estimated from a «mixed» function, combining a deterministic 
element and a stochastic element: this is the way by which instabilities of exports and of agricultural production have been estimated in 
the EVI used by CDP and that we retain in the next simulations. Several other measures are used in the empirical literature on matters of 
our concern. For instance, measurements of growth volatility generally use the standard deviation of the rate of growth (which may not 
be appropriate, when the rate of growth is not stationary). Other works on volatility  use empirical filters such as the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter, from which a series is shared into a “cycle” and a “trend” components.  We have compared the instabilities  with regard to a trend 
measu  red as done for the CDP from a mixed trend over 12 years and to an Hodrick-Prescott trend: correlations obtained between the 
two series of instability are very high (either level or rank correlations) (CERDI calculations) 
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handicap, without being an (unexpected) shock. And often terms of trade trends are reversible 
(what the trend in sea level is probably not).  
 
Equal weight is given to the trade shock index and to the natural shock index when 
they are averaged in a shock index.  
 
  Exposure to shocks indicators 
 
 Exposure indices are of particular importance for two reasons. One is of course that 
the impact of shocks is the stronger the more exposed the countries are. The other one is 
that shocks indicators rely on the frequency of past events, taken as a probability of 
similar future events, but do not reflect the risk of being affected by future exceptional 
events, which depends of the exposure and thus can be captured through exposure indices. 
Four indicators are used for the measurement of the exposition to shocks. 
 
1) The first one to have been retained is an index of the population size (in logs), 
considering that small size is a handicap, due to vulnerability and other factors, as 
explained above. 
 
2) The export concentration coefficient, as calculated for a long time by UNCTAD, and 
often used in academic literature, has also been retained since the first definition of the 
EVI, although limited to the exports of goods (not including services). 
 
3) The share of agriculture, forestry, fisheries has been considered since 2003, instead  of 
the (complement to 100 of the) share of manufacturing and modern services, as better 
reflecting the exposure to trade and natural shocks. 
 
4) An index of remoteness from world markets (adjusted for landlockness) has been 
designed and calculated at CERDI and used by the CDP for the measurement of EVI. 
It measures the minimum (weighted) average distance for a country to reach a 
significant part (50%°) of the world market. With regard to each of these indicators, 
the situation the LDCs appear on average more vulnerable than other developing 
countries. 
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EVI in brief 
EVI in brief
Smallness Location Index Trade shock Index
Population
Population Remoteness Merchandise 
export 
concentration
Share of 
agriculture, 
forestry, 
and 
fisheries
Homelessness 
due to natural 
disasters
Instability 
of 
agricultural 
production
Economic Vulnerability Index
Instability of 
exports of goods 
and services
Shock Index (50%)
Specialisation Index Natural shock Index
Exposure Index (50%)
50% 25% 25% 50% 50%
 
 
 
1.3. Methodological choices to aggregate the components: weighting and averaging issues 
 
          The component indicators of EVI have been weighted and arithmetically averaged in a 
simple and transparent, although somewhat arbitrary way. We here examine whether 
alternative methods could be considered. 
   
                         Arbitrary or revealed weights: vulnerability measured as an expected loss of growth? 
The simplest and most transparent way to aggregate is, after measuring each component on 
the same scale depending on maximum and minimum values, to calculate an unweighted 
average of these components (as commonly done for some popular indices such as the HDI). 
There is indeed an apparent arbitrariness in this weighting since the actual weight is given by 
the number of components, then results from the choice of the components themselves. It has 
appeared reasonable to give equal weight to the shock components and to exposure 
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components so that the vulnerability index is an average of a shock index (SH) and an 
exposure index (EXP), as well to give equal weight to trade shocks (TS) and natural shocks 
(NS). As to the exposure index, since the main factor of exposure is the (small) size of the 
population (SP), it has been given a half weight, the other half (RS) being shared between the 
location component (remoteness) and the economic structure or specialization component 
(share of agriculture and export concentration). 
 
To avoid the arbitrariness of equal weighting, some measures of vulnerability weigh 
the components by their estimated impact on the rate of growth or its instability. For instance 
Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001,2004 have used a set of component indicators to build a 
composite indicator of vulnerability, with the weights not chosen a priori, but drawn from an 
econometric regression so that they reflect the estimated impact on economic growth of the 
different components indicators (which is consistent with the definition of vulnerability as a 
handicap to growth). The resulting vulnerability indicator can be seen as the ceteris paribus 
impact on economic growth of the exogenous shocks and exposure variables. It is the 
estimated loss of growth due to structural vulnerability.18 However it has to be recognized that 
this method of measurement of structural vulnerability, dependent on the quality of the 
regressions, seems more appropriate for academic use than for international policy. Moreover 
specific problems arise to aggregate vulnerability indicators, which must be addressed in any 
case. 
     
                                                 
18
 Another example of an econometric weighting is given by the Commonwealth Secretariat index of vulnerability (Atkins 
and Mazzi 1998, Easter 1999). It is an estimated value of instability of the rate of growth, with three explanatory variables 
empirically chosen among a lot (more than fifty), which reflect policy factors as well as structural factors. One main problem 
with this indicator is that it measures vulnerability with regard to growth volatility, which,as noted above, is not  a good 
synthetic indicator of structural vulnerability since it depends on policy factors as well as structural ones. An alternative 
method would be to consider a “natural growth volatility” estimated from a regression including only structural factors, not 
depending on policy, as the components of EVI are supposed to be. But such a measure would not be preferable to the 
estimation of the impact on growth of the structural vulnerability components: structural vulnerability has been designed with 
reference to growth, and would be better measured by a loss of growth than by an excess volatility. 
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Reflecting the interaction between shocks and exposure. Let us consider the index of 
economic vulnerability as relying on the four following elements: a shock index composed by 
a trade shock index and of a natural shock index, and an exposure index composed by a (low) 
size index and a “location and structure index”. Several averaging methods may be used to 
combine shocks and exposure indices. In the (traditional) arithmetic averaging of the (four) 
indices each index being taken independently from the other. If we want to take into account 
the fact that structural vulnerability depends on the interaction of shocks and exposure, we 
may consider  other methods of averaging. 
 
One method would be a “semi-geometric” averaging. It combines a geometric  
averaging the two composite shock and exposure indices and an arithmetic averaging the 
respective components of these shock and exposure indices: the exogenous shocks indices, 
because these shocks are substitute, are arithmetically averaged in an index of the shocks, and  
an index of the exposure to the shocks is similarly measured as an arithmetic average of the 
corresponding components, but the two respective indices of shocks and of exposure to the 
shocks are geometrically averaged, because shocks and exposure  have multiplicative effects. 
Shocks make a country all the more vulnerable that it is more exposed. Exposure makes a 
country all the more vulnerable that the shocks are more important. But this metod should be 
specified with regard to another consideration or principle. 
 
Reflecting the increasing marginal impact of vulnerability components. Rather to 
calculate the geometric average of the shock and exposure indices (EXP and SK) as 
EVI = EXP ⋅ SK , 
it would be preferable to consider that the higher impact is to be given to that of the two shock 
and exposure indices which is the  higher and to calculate: 
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           EVI = 1 − 1 − EXP( ) 1 − SK( ) 
The EVI is then drawn from a multiplicative index of   low vulnerability. The relevance of 
this measurement can be illustrated by tsunami: as far as the likelihood of shocks is not easy 
to assess, it is all the more important to consider very exposed countries as vulnerable, even if 
the past frequency of the shocks has been low.19 
 
Another kind of averaging, an intermediate, but convenient one, is to take an 
arithmetic average of the indices of log values of each the two shock and the two exposure 
indices after transforming them in indices of low vulnerability. It allows one to capture the 
various interactions between these elements in the determination of vulnerability (each 
component being first measured as a low vulnerability indicator, transformed in log, then 
taken as one less the index of this log value, so that to reflect a likely increasing marginal 
impact of factors of vulnerability). This arithmetic average of complements to one of the 
log indices of the main vulnerability components can be written (with l’:index of the log 
of): 
    EVI(al) = ¼ [(1-I’P)+(1- I’(1-RS)+(1-l’(1-NS)+(1-l’(1-TS))]   
 
The resulting EVI is decomposable into each of the four indices (and their sub 
grouping in shocks and exposure indices). 
 
Sensitivity of results. Of course major changes in the level of EVI can be expected 
from the changes in the choice of components and the weight given to each of them. 
Significant differences can be observed between the EVI measured in 2006 and that would 
                                                 
19
 It would indeed be conceivable to weigh the respective shock indicators by corresponding exposure indicators. In other 
words, each indicator of the size of the shocks could be weighted by an indicator of the exposure assumed to correspond 
to the shocks, and the aggregate index of vulnerability could be decomposed in vulnerability sub-indices related to each 
kind of shock. But there is no simple correspondence between shock and exposure indicators, for instance small size 
economies appear to be more exposed to natural shocks, not only to trade shocks (Maldives). Thus it seems easier and 
more relevant to weigh the average shock index by the average exposure index. 
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have been obtained with the composition and weights of the EVI used in 2003 (average of 
the absolute difference of ranks among 65 LDCs and other LICS nearly equal to 7). It is an 
expected result of the improvements brought in the meanwhile.  
 
         More interesting is to look at the consequences of averaging methods. Table 2 gives 
a simulation of EVI 2006 with several ways of averaging, comparisons being made 
through  differences of ranks among a set of 65 LDCs and other LICs, and the average of 
the absolute values of these differences. A larger difference from the arithmetic average 
used in 2006  is obtained with arithmetic average of log indices than with semi-geometric 
average. It is so because trade and natural shocks, separated in the former, but not in the 
latter (where they are gathered by a simple arithmetic average) are uncorrelated. The 
higher the number of components, the larger the difference. 
 
 
 1.4. Comparing synthetic indices; levels and trends 
 
 We briefly compare the synthetic indices from two data sets. One is the official data 
set of the 2006 review of the list of LDCs by the CDP. The other one is the tentative data set 
of a "retrospective EVI", calculated by CERDI/FERDI in collaboration with DESA over a 
thirty year period beginning in 1970 and according to the 2006 EVI definition20: it shows no 
decrease on average in LDCs, but a decrease elsewhere. Two more detailed tables 
respectively related to levels and trends by groups of countries are given at the end of the 
paper (Tables 3 and 4). 
 
Averages from the 2006 review of LDC list 
 
                          Shock Index   Exposure Index             EVI 
• SIDS               45                     67                          56 
                                                 
20
 This data set will be available soon from DESA website 
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• LDCs               52                    55                          53 
• Other LICs     37                     37                          37 
• All LICs          47                    44                          46                                       
• All  MICs        37                    47                          43      
• Landlocked     44                    51                          47        
 
Averages from a retrospective data base 
 
                                         EVI                           Shock index    Exposure index    
                      1970-79  1980-89 1990-99                          1990-99    
• SIDS            59          56           54                     44                       64 
• Non SIDS    43          40           40                     39                       40    
• LDCs           53          52           51                     49                       54 
• Non LDCs   43          39           38                     35                       41 
 
 
 
 Results do not differ significantly between the two sets of data and allow one to draw a 
few observations about levels and trends: 
- EVI is higher in LDCs as well as in SIDS compared to other developing countries; 
- The gap between LDCs and non LDCs is increasing while the gap between SIDS and non 
SIDS is decreasing; 
- EVI is still higher in SIDS than in LDCs, but it is less and less so 
- while the exposure index is significantly higher in SIDS than in LDCs, the shock index is 
higher in LDCs;  
- the narrowing of the gap between LDCs and SIDS is entirely due to the shock index, the gap 
between the average exposure indices having not changed (see annex table); 
- the slightly higher level of EVI in low income countries compared to middle income ones is 
due to a quite higher shock index, while exposure index is lower. 
   
            In brief and on average EVI not only is higher in LDCs than in any other group of 
countries (except SIDS), but also does not appear to have declined as in other groups 
(including SIDS). 
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2. Using EVI for international development policy 
 
 We here consider two main policy implications of the availability of the EVI. The 
more direct one is related to the identification of the LDCs, for which the index has been built, 
the other one, both more indirect and general, to the use of EVI as an instrument in the design 
of aid policies. 
 
4.1. EVI as a criterion for LDCs identification: the graduation issue21  
 
 As noted in the introduction, EVI is one of the three criteria used by the CDP for the 
identification of the LDCs, the other two being the GNI per capita and the Human Assets 
Index (HAI), a composite index of health and education indicators. To be included into the 
list a country must meet the three criteria, considered as complementary: to be low income, 
with a low level of human capital, and highly vulnerable, what is assessed thanks to the three 
criteria. This complementarity in the three criteria is consistent with the assumption of a joint 
effect of vulnerability and human capital on growth. The LDCs are the LICs suffering the 
most from structural handicaps and are supposed to be those evidencing both a low HAI and a 
high EVI (three criteria complementary for inclusion). It means that a high EVI is used to 
identify a risk of a poverty trap when associated with low HAI. The use of EVI has led to few 
new inclusions since 2000. Only Senegal became in 2000 included due to the use of EVI, and 
Papua New Guinea eligible in 2006, its inclusion pending on its acceptance. 
 
          The possibility of a graduation from the list, and related rules were introduced only in 
1991. These rules have been cautiously designed, to avoid premature graduations, and an 
instability in the list resulting from countries again eligible for inclusion after 
graduation….Margins have been imposed between inclusion and graduation thresholds of the 
criteria. Eligibility for graduation has to be found at two successive triennial reviews. And, 
more important, to be eligible for graduation an LDC must cease to meet not only one, but 
two of the three criteria which are to be met for inclusion. Briefly stated, implementation of 
the criteria is asymmetric for inclusion and graduation. 
                                                 
21
 These issues are more deeply examined in Guillaumont (2007a) 
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 Since 1991 only one country has been graduated (Botswana in 1994). The graduation 
of two other countries has been decided in 2004 by the UN General Assembly (Cape Verde 
and Maldives), to be implemented later. Another one has been recommended in 2006 by the 
CDP for graduation (Samoa). Moreover, still in 2006, three other countries have been found 
eligible for a first time by the CDP (Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), an eligibility which has to 
be reconsidered at the 2009 review, and should be confirmed  before any recommendation. 
 
 It has to be noted that all the above present LDCs likely to be graduated are SIDS. 
Their spontaneous reaction was to resist against the CDP recommendation. Resistance was 
particularly active from Maldives, as it is now from Samoa. The main argument opposed to 
graduation is that these countries are highly vulnerable, as evidenced by the level of their EVI. 
Pushing ahead this argument some countries likely to be graduated have requested that an 
LDC could not be graduated unless it is no longer found (highly) vulnerable, so that (low) 
EVI would become a « compulsory » criterion. 
 
 If it was the case the "asymmetry" between inclusion and graduation criteria would 
become even deeper, since while meeting three criteria are needed for inclusion, graduation, 
instead to be proposed when only one criterion is no longer met (symmetry) or when two 
criteria are no longer met (present asymmetry), would be possible only when all the three 
criteria would be no longer met. Such a solution would make any graduation very unlikely, 
even for SIDS becoming upper middle income countries, and would lead to a quite 
inequitable treatment between developing countries. If some developing countries have been 
able to achieve sustainabily a significant rate of growth, and high levels of human capital as 
well, it means that they are not locked in a poverty trap, as LDCs are roughly supposed to be. 
And their high level of human capital, reflected in that they meet the corresponding (HAI) 
graduation criterion, is probably the reason of it. 
 
         However their vulnerability remains a matter of concern, for all the reasons listed above. 
This why a smooth transition strategy for graduating countries has been proposed by the CDP, 
then designed and officially adopted by the General Assembly. This is also an argument to 
consider, through EVI, the economic vulnerability as a relevant parameter of aid policies.  
 
4.2. EVI as a criterion for aid allocation 
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Back to some results about aid effectiveness 
 
 Structural vulnerability, sometimes captured only by (exogeneous) export instability, 
although a negative factor of growth, has been found to increase the marginal aid 
effectiveness (the marginal contribution of aid to growth) and to do so more significantly than 
the quality of institutions and policy, so strongly put forward by Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
and the World Bank (1998): in other words aid dampens the negative effects of vulnerability 
on growth (Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001, Chauvet and Guillaumont 2003, 2007). These 
results from growth regressions are supported by micro-macro analysis of the determinants of 
the rate of success of World Bank projects (Guillaumont and Laajaj 2006). It follows that aid 
is potentially more effective in vulnerable countries such as SIDS and LDC. To be noted, 
either pro-cyclical or contra-cyclical, aid may have a stabilising impact with regard to exports, 
which we measure by the difference between the export instability and the aid plus export 
instability. This stabilising impact is a significant factor of growth, enlightening our previous 
results (Chauvet and Guillaumont 2007). Moreover, through its stabilising impact aid has a 
double effect on poverty reduction. First it enhances growth, which is a major factor of 
poverty reduction. Second, making growth more stable, as noted above it also makes it more 
pro-poor (Guillaumont 2006). These findings, briefly recalled, have implications for aid 
policies, and EVI may be helpful to draw such implications. 
 
  
Structural vulnerability included among the criteria for aid allocation22 
 
 The easier way by which it is possible to take into account the economic vulnerability 
in the design of aid policies is to consider it as a relevant criterion of aid selectivity. Usual 
criteria of aid selectivity are the level of poverty (income per capita) and the quality of 
governance (the CPIA at the World Bank or any other index, such as ICRG or the Kaufman 
and Kraay index) (see for instance Collier and Dollar 2001, 2002, World Bank 2004, 2005). 
They do not include vulnerability, what could easily be done with EVI. 
 
                                                 
22
 More details can be found in Amprou, Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney (2007) and in Guillaumont 
and Guillaumont Jeanneney (2006) 
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          There are at least two reasons to do it. First, as just seen above, aid effectiveness is 
increased by structural vulnerability: allocated according to vulnerability (among other 
criteria) aid will be more effective. It is an argument as well empirically grounded than the 
similar argument used to retain governance as a criterion. Second there is a reason of justice 
or equity: if we admit that a goal of aid is to compensate for structural handicaps to growth in 
order to promote an equality of opportunities/chances, it is again legitimate to retain structural 
vulnerability as a criterion for aid allocation. 
   
          Finally a practical matter has to be kept in mind. Retaining vulnerability, possibly EVI, 
as an ex ante aid allocation criterion would lead to an immediate dampening of unforeseen 
shocks, what is less easy to do with the schemes (nevertheless useful) trying to trigger aid as 
an insurance. We have extendly discussed these views in other papers (Guillaumont 2006, 
Guillaumont et al 2007, Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 2003, see also Collier et al. 
1999, Sarris 2003, Gilbert and Tabova 2005). The challenge is to quickly compensate for 
negative shocks, while promoting good governance and avoiding moral hazard23. Here again, 
for the implementation of such schemes, priority could be given to developing countries 
recognised as highly vulnerable with regard to EVI. In any case an effective implementation 
is more difficult than the inclusion of EVI among the aid allocation criteria. 
 
         Such an inclusion would lead to significant changes in aid allocation, benefiting to more 
vulnerable countries,  LDCs, and SIDS as well.  And it would change radically the assessment 
of the aid selectivity of donors, as we have recently evidenced elsewhere (Amprou, 
Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 2007, see table 4 drawn from this paper): we have 
compared the rank of donors, bilateral as well as multilateral, for their aid selectivity, 
measured either from the aid elasticities to the indicators corresponding to the agreed criteria, 
as done by Dollar and Levin, or by what we have called the average profile of receivers, the 
profile being the average of the level of these indicators, weighted by the share of aid 
allocated to each of them. Summary results are given below. 
                                                 
23
 The answer is to offer automatic compensation when management rules (in particular in case of positive shocks) are ex 
ante agreed and implemented; It could be obtained through a regulation of debt service (+/-) according to the evolution of the 
terms of trade, or through a special fund for little indebted countries. Links between the  micro and macro variables have to 
be checked, to make the insurance scheme effective not only at the macrolevel, but also for the groups more severely affected 
by the shocks, such as small farmers.  
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Summary impact of changing the measurement of aid selectivity: 
average absolute value of  rank differences for 42 donors (multilateral & bilateral) 
                                     and  for only 22 bilateral donors, 2003 
 
 All 43 
donors 
Bilateral 
only 
between Dollar-Levin (2004) indices and other elasticity based 
estimates, inlcuding : 
  
Income pc and other governance index (KKI) 8.7 3.8 
Income pc and vulnerability (EVI) 13.5 7.63 
Income pc and MDGs (HAI) 11.8 6.09 
All the five criteria ("global model")  12.8 7.27 
   
between an index based on global allocation model estimates and 
recipient average profile index 
7.25 3.63 
   
 
Source: Amprou , Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney (2007) 
 
        Structural vulnerability versus state fragility in aid allocation: EVI versus CPIA 
 
         The concern about fragile states, enlightened by this conference, may enhance our 
argument  presenting structural vulnerability (possibly measured by EVI) as a relevant 
criterion for aid allocation and help to solve the following paradox: on one hand according to 
the traditional paradigm aid is not effective in countries with poor policies and institutions 
(generally measured by CPIA), on the other hand there is a growing feeling that some aid has 
to be provided to fragile states (still often identified by CPIA) to avoid they become even 
more fragile. The so called "orphean sates" are the children of the traditional paradigm...24 It 
is not surprising that the results of regressions on aid effectiveness in fragile states are 
uncertain or complex (see Chauvet and Collier 2005, McGillivray and Feeny, 2007). 
Structural vulnerability, as we argue, makes aid more effective, but also is a factor of state 
fragility, which, when measured by a policy indicator such as CPIA, is expected to make aid 
less effective.  Actually in a previous paper (Chauvet and Guillaumont 2004) we found that, 
                                                 
24
 Indeed, for the year 2005 and 57 IDA eligible countries for which CPIA data are available, the level of CPIA 
appears significantly and negatively correlated to that of EVI (as measured for the 2006 review), once controlled 
for the level of income per capita.   
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.14 
 
32 
while aid effectiveness is increased by structural vulnerability, it is decreased by political 
instability (a form of state fragility), and it also decreases with the quality of the previous 
policy (suggesting a possible improvement from a low level or fragile state when aid is 
appropriately delivered). When state fragility results from structural vulnerability, aid 
dampens its negative effect. When it does not, it is likely to have the opposite effect.  
 
           Anyway there is a need to investigate the relationships between structural vulnerability 
and state fragility, as well as their implications for aid allocation. It could be argued that 
structural vulnerability (through EVI) should be a criterion for aid allocation, while state 
fragility, or any policy or institutional indicator, should be considered to determine the 
appropriate modalities of aid,  and not only as (even less than) an aid allocation criterion 
( Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 2006).  
 
        Conclusion: two uses of EVI, complementary 
  
         Structural economic vulnerability is a matter of concern, particularly for small states 
(SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), although differently for each other. It can be 
conveniently captured by the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) designed at the UN by the 
Committee for Development Policy. This index is an instrument needed for international 
development policies in two complementary fields. 
 
          One is the identification of LDCs, which are the low income countries suffering the 
most from structural handicaps to growth. Economic vulnerability, as reflected by EVI, is one 
of the two main structural handicaps to be considered, not independently of the other one, a 
low level of human capital (as measured by HAI): to be included into the list of LDCs, 
countries, at the time they meet the vulnerability criterion, should have a low income per 
capita and a low level of human capital; consequently, while still vulnerable, a country having 
reached a per capita income level well above the low income threshold and a level of human 
capital relatively high is likely to  be graduated from the list.  
 
          The second field where the use of EVI is needed is the geographical allocation of aid: 
for effectiveness and equity reasons, structural vulnerability (EVI) should be considered as 
one of the main relevant criteria of aid allocation; its use would favour vulnerable countries, 
LDCs and SIDS as well, and would possibly legitimate aid to some fragile states. 
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Two reasons may be given to underline the complementarity of these two uses of EVI. 
First, using EVI as an  aid allocation criterion would both facilitate reaching the specific 
target of ODA to LDCs (0.15%) and lead to modulate aid among them. Second it would 
allow graduated, but still vulnerable, former LDCs (generally SIDS) to still benefit from 
some preference in aid allocation, while no longer LDCs.  
 
      Through these two uses, and possibly other ones (such as trade policy), EVI, possibly 
improved, may serve to take structural vulnerability into account effectively.  
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Table 1 - EVI level for 65 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and other low income countries, as calculated for the 2006 review of the list of LDCs, with the measure of each component
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = 1/2 (3+4) (6) (7) (8) = 0.5 (6+7) (9) (10)= (11)= 0.5 (10+11)
0.5( (1)+ 0.5(2+5) ) 0.5 (8+9)
EVI, 2006 review Population, 2005 Remoteness  Export concentration shares of agriculture, etc. Specialisation % homeless Agricultural instability Natural Export instability exposure shock 
2003 or latest year 2003 or 2004 index 1990-2004 1979-2004 shock 1979-2004 index index EVI
(Main source: UNCTAD) index Trade shock
values Max-min Indice Max-min values Max-min values Max-min values logs Max-min values Max-min values Max-min
LI L Afghanistan 29 863 010       18,59 0,766 83,30 0,318 a 25,65 38,0 63,33 44,49 0,51 -0,67 60,83 15,36 74,91 67,87 32,10 90,95 41,24 79,41 60,33
LI L Angola 15 941 390       28,24 0,679 72,36 0,911 95,42 15,5 25,78 60,60 0,21 -1,58 51,11 4,68 17,16 34,14 17,37 44,91 47,36 39,52 43,44
LI L Bangladesh 141 822 300     0,00 0,587 60,82 0,298 23,32 19,8 33,05 28,19 2,88 1,06 79,22 3,47 10,67 44,95 7,38 13,68 22,25 29,31 25,78
LI L Benin 8 438 853         38,02 0,579 59,84 0,456 41,92 35,0 58,35 50,13 0,91 -0,09 66,99 6,48 26,92 46,95 24,71 67,83 46,50 57,39 51,95
LI L Bhutan 2 162 546         58,96 0,768 83,50 0,415 37,01 33,2 55,38 46,20 0,06 -2,89 37,16 6,32 26,05 31,60 12,95 31,09 61,91 31,35 46,63
LI L Burkina Faso 13 227 840       31,11 0,736 79,54 0,602 59,06 33,8 56,37 57,71 0,12 -2,09 45,73 7,76 33,86 39,80 18,10 47,20 49,87 43,50 46,68
LI L Burundi 7 547 515         39,74 0,864 95,54 0,650 64,67 49,0 81,67 73,17 0,42 -0,87 58,64 5,64 22,37 40,51 26,97 74,91 62,05 57,71 59,88
LI L Cambodia 14 071 010       30,16 0,636 67,03 0,405 a 35,87 34,0 56,71 46,29 2,39 0,87 77,23 8,01 35,19 56,21 24,20 66,24 43,41 61,22 52,32
LI Cameroon 16 321 860       27,88 0,598 62,31 0,448 40,99 23,1 38,47 39,73 0,02 -3,74 28,14 3,53 10,97 19,55 13,84 33,86 39,45 26,71 33,08
L Cape Verde 506 807            81,28 0,580 59,96 0,482 44,98 6,2 10,33 27,65 1,19 0,17 69,79 15,96 78,16 73,97 13,44 32,62 62,54 53,30 57,92
LI L Central African Republic 4 037 747         49,36 0,802 87,71 0,491 45,94 59,3 98,91 72,43 1,55 0,44 72,59 3,89 12,91 42,75 12,92 31,01 64,71 36,88 50,80
LI L Chad 9 748 931         35,80 0,671 71,33 0,630 a 62,37 29,9 49,84 56,11 1,16 0,14 69,48 7,81 34,11 51,80 40,32 100,00 49,76 75,90 62,83
LI L Comoros 797 902            74,30 0,727 78,36 0,881 91,88 40,9 68,11 80,00 0,08 -2,55 40,76 2,87 7,39 24,08 27,59 76,84 76,74 50,46 63,60
LI Congo,Rep of 3 998 904         49,51 0,658 69,81 0,853 88,61 6,3 10,46 49,53 1,60 0,47 72,97 2,32 4,45 38,71 19,17 50,52 54,59 44,61 49,60
LI Côte d'Ivoire 18 153 870       26,24 0,603 62,91 0,389 33,99 25,9 43,17 38,58 0,114 c -2,17 44,87 4,28 15,04 29,95 11,68 27,13 38,49 28,54 33,52
LI Dem. Peo's Rep.Korea 22 487 660       22,95 0,602 62,74 0,251 a 17,77 29,9 49,87 33,82 4,35 1,47 83,58 8,15 35,94 59,76 12,53 29,77 35,61 44,77 40,19
LI L Dem. Rep. of the Congo 57 548 740       8,50 0,658 69,77 0,555 a 53,58 51,9 86,57 70,08 0,35 -1,04 56,89 3,72 12,00 34,44 21,44 57,62 39,21 46,03 42,62
L Djibouti 793 078            74,39 0,618 64,75 0,584 56,91 3,1 5,15 31,03 3,33 1,20 80,73 8,81 39,52 60,12 21,64 58,25 61,14 59,19 60,16
LI L Equatorial Guinea 503 519            81,38 0,602 62,74 0,888 a 92,67 34,7 57,90 75,29 2,156 d 0,77 76,11 6,78 28,52 52,31 28,64 80,13 75,20 66,22 70,71
LI L Eritrea 4 401 357         48,03 0,618 64,70 0,589 57,51 13,6 22,74 40,12 0,49 -0,72 60,27 18,76 93,29 76,78 28,19 78,72 50,22 77,75 63,99
LI L Ethiopia 77 430 700       3,93 0,618 64,70 0,411 36,62 43,0 71,63 54,13 0,20 -1,59 51,07 14,28 69,06 60,06 13,84 33,89 31,67 46,97 39,32
LI L Gambia 1 517 079         64,41 0,561 57,60 0,459 42,28 26,4 43,98 43,13 0,42 -0,87 58,68 18,42 91,47 75,08 13,51 32,85 57,39 53,96 55,68
LI Ghana 22 112 810       23,21 0,597 62,17 0,390 34,08 36,1 60,19 47,14 1,30 0,27 70,77 7,66 33,30 52,04 14,56 36,12 38,93 44,08 41,50
LI L Guinea 9 402 098         36,36 0,587 60,85 0,547 52,55 21,6 36,06 44,31 0,302 d -1,20 55,21 3,48 10,72 32,97 8,25 16,41 44,47 24,69 34,58
LI L Guinea-Bissau 1 586 344         63,73 0,572 58,99 0,877 91,40 67,8 100,00 95,70 0,10 -2,27 43,79 4,26 14,92 29,35 33,18 94,30 70,54 61,83 66,18
LI L Haiti 8 527 777         37,86 0,632 66,55 0,273 20,34 28,3 47,11 33,73 1,54 0,43 72,56 2,73 6,63 39,59 34,89 99,66 44,00 69,63 56,81
LI India 1 103 371 000  0,00 0,559 57,42 0,130 3,55 22,2 37,01 20,28 0,51 -0,68 60,74 3,11 8,71 34,72 3,85 2,67 19,43 18,70 19,06
LI Indonesia 222 781 500     0,00 0,749 81,16 0,125 2,91 16,0 26,71 14,81 0,42 -0,86 58,80 3,08 8,56 33,68 8,66 17,68 23,99 25,68 24,84
LI Kenya 34 255 720       16,48 0,673 71,57 0,251 17,81 14,0 23,29 20,55 0,01 -4,49 20,11 5,42 21,21 20,66 7,40 13,75 31,27 17,20 24,24
L Kiribati 99 350              100,00 0,724 78,00 0,643 63,91 17,3 28,82 46,36 5,013 d 1,61 85,10 12,55 59,72 72,41 49,82 100,00 81,09 86,20 83,65
LI L Laos 5 924 145         43,46 0,808 88,47 0,312 a 24,96 48,1 80,09 52,52 20,34 3,01 100,00 8,16 35,99 67,99 18,84 49,52 56,98 58,76 57,87
LI L Lesotho 1 794 769         61,83 1,000 100,00 0,352 29,59 16,1 26,77 28,18 0,06 -2,83 37,78 7,56 32,76 35,27 16,09 40,92 62,96 38,09 50,53
LI L Liberia 3 283 267         52,54 0,604 63,03 0,634 62,86 75,8 100,00 81,43 0,08 -2,52 41,14 11,28 52,88 47,01 35,17 100,00 62,39 73,51 67,95
LI L Madagascar 18 605 920       25,86 0,735 79,32 0,483 45,07 26,2 43,63 44,35 3,78 1,33 82,10 2,25 4,03 43,06 14,36 35,50 43,85 39,28 41,57
LI L Malawi 12 883 940       31,51 0,931 100,00 0,605 59,46 33,6 56,07 57,76 0,49 -0,71 60,43 10,12 46,58 53,51 13,06 31,43 55,20 42,47 48,83
L Maldives 329 198            87,91 0,788 86,03 0,472 43,74 7,7 12,80 28,27 13,80 2,62 95,87 4,00 13,54 54,70 5,61 8,16 72,53 31,43 51,98
LI L Mali 13 518 420       30,78 0,747 80,86 0,822 84,99 36,3 60,57 72,78 0,14 -1,98 46,91 6,13 25,04 35,98 11,62 26,94 53,80 31,46 42,63
LI L Mauritania 3 068 742         53,58 0,511 51,43 0,509 48,09 19,9 33,17 40,63 1,83 0,60 74,35 3,40 10,27 42,31 9,51 20,33 49,80 31,32 40,56
LI Mongolia 2 646 487         55,86 0,775 84,36 0,357 30,28 20,0 33,38 31,83 0,01 -5,09 13,78 8,06 35,46 24,62 18,45 48,29 56,98 36,46 46,72
LI L Mozambique 19 792 300       24,91 0,759 82,43 0,631 a 62,48 21,5 35,80 49,14 3,03 1,11 79,75 7,30 31,37 55,56 11,96 27,99 45,35 41,78 43,56
LI L Myanmar 50 519 490       10,50 0,598 62,21 0,358 30,40 58,3 97,24 63,82 0,31 -1,17 55,50 4,97 18,76 37,13 21,64 58,24 36,76 47,69 42,22
LI L Nepal 27 132 630       20,06 0,758 82,20 0,304 24,01 38,0 63,39 43,70 0,60 -0,51 62,49 3,95 13,26 37,87 12,23 28,84 41,50 33,35 37,43
LI Nicaragua 5 486 685         44,64 0,692 73,95 0,220 14,14 17,8 29,70 21,92 0,43 -0,83 59,05 8,81 39,52 49,29 13,79 33,71 46,29 41,50 43,89
LI L Niger 13 956 980       30,28 0,722 77,69 0,548 52,72 38,4 64,06 58,39 0,89 -0,11 66,73 12,98 62,03 64,38 14,93 37,27 49,16 50,83 49,99
LI Nigeria 131 529 700     0,00 0,579 59,84 0,996 100,00 25,7 42,87 71,43 0,31 -1,18 55,36 3,73 12,08 33,72 28,50 79,68 32,82 56,70 44,76
LI Pakistan 157 935 100     0,00 0,542 55,28 0,231 15,36 21,5 35,87 25,62 5,83 1,76 86,71 3,23 9,34 48,02 7,62 14,43 20,22 31,23 25,73
LI Papua New Guinea 5 887 138         43,56 0,708 75,99 0,374 32,20 27,5 45,83 39,02 3,40 1,22 80,97 1,60 0,53 40,75 14,13 34,79 50,53 37,77 44,15
LI L Rwanda 9 037 690         36,97 0,849 93,69 0,395 34,75 41,3 68,84 51,79 0,11 -2,18 44,76 13,58 65,30 55,03 26,23 72,58 54,85 63,81 59,33
L Samoa 184 984            96,78 0,815 89,33 0,602 59,09 13,1 21,82 40,46 16,29 2,79 97,64 7,52 32,54 65,09 13,19 31,85 80,83 48,47 64,65
LI L Sao Tome and Principe 156 523            99,35 0,620 65,06 0,927 97,27 17,0 28,27 62,77 0,002 b -6,38 0,00 7,03 29,87 14,94 20,41 54,40 81,63 34,67 58,15
LI L Senegal 11 658 170       33,05 0,561 57,58 0,290 22,32 15,1 25,17 23,75 0,57 -0,56 62,01 16,53 81,26 71,63 9,99 21,83 36,86 46,73 41,80
LI L Sierra Leone 5 525 478         44,54 0,594 61,72 0,857 89,07 47,9 79,78 84,42 0,253 d -1,37 53,31 5,46 21,39 37,35 35,97 100,00 58,80 68,68 63,74
LI L Solomon Islands 477 742            82,18 0,764 82,94 0,437 39,65 44,9 74,86 57,26 0,32 -1,12 55,97 9,68 44,23 50,10 11,06 25,18 76,14 37,64 56,89
LI L Somalia 8 227 826         38,41 0,664 70,47 0,907 94,91 65,0 100,00 97,45 6,98 1,94 88,62 9,12 41,18 64,90 30,63 86,34 61,19 75,62 68,40
LI L Sudan 36 232 950       15,61 0,547 55,82 0,589 57,56 45,6 76,06 66,81 0,73 -0,31 64,59 8,42 37,39 50,99 25,88 71,49 38,46 61,24 49,85
LI L Tanzania, United Rep. of 38 328 810       14,75 0,699 74,93 0,347 29,07 41,3 68,86 48,97 0,19 -1,64 50,50 3,97 13,35 31,92 11,92 27,88 38,35 29,90 34,12
LI L Timor-Leste 947 064            71,66 0,469 46,08 0,259 a 18,70 30,5 50,80 34,75 0,109 d -2,22 44,31 4,88 18,29 31,30 120,80 100,00 56,04 65,65 60,84
LI L Togo 6 145 004         42,90 0,592 61,52 0,318 25,64 40,8 67,98 46,81 1,58 0,46 72,83 5,47 21,45 47,14 15,49 39,03 48,53 43,08 45,81
L Tuvalu 10 441              100,00 0,764 82,94 0,978 100,00 18,9 31,44 65,72 5,52 1,71 86,12 21,10 100,00 93,06 42,69 100,00 87,17 96,53 91,85
LI L Uganda 28 816 230       19,14 0,853 94,13 0,288 22,13 30,9 51,44 36,79 0,17 -1,77 49,08 3,27 9,57 29,33 27,25 75,77 42,30 52,55 47,42
L Vanuatu, Republic of 211 367            94,73 0,764 82,94 0,404 35,75 21,4 35,62 35,69 5,16 1,64 85,40 8,81 39,49 62,44 15,96 40,51 77,02 51,48 64,25
LI Viet Nam 84 238 230       2,64 0,605 63,17 0,239 16,32 20,1 33,48 24,90 1,52 0,42 72,42 2,12 3,37 37,90 21,69 58,40 23,34 48,15 35,74
LI L Yemen 20 974 660       24,02 0,563 57,91 0,896 93,62 14,2 23,73 58,68 1,25 0,23 70,34 5,21 20,07 45,20 16,09 40,90 41,16 43,05 42,11
LI L Zambia 11 668 460       33,04 0,939 100,00 0,504 47,58 20,8 34,72 41,15 0,11 -2,21 44,42 9,86 45,19 44,80 14,62 36,33 51,81 40,56 46,19
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Table 2: Impact of averaging on the level of EVI, recalculated from the data of the 2006 review 
of the list of LDCs, regrouped in four categories of equal weight, 65 LDCS and other low 
income developing countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
arithmetic semi-geometric arithmetic of logs average of ranks rank differences
values ranks values ranks values ranks values ranks 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3
LI L Afghanistan 60,33 52 65,22 54 41,21 46 50,67 51 -2 6 1 8
LI L Angola 43,44 22 43,58 21 28,45 23 22,00 21 1 -1 1 -2
LI L Bangladesh 25,78 5 25,87 4 13,85 4 4,33 5 1 1 0 0
LI L Benin 51,95 40 52,26 39 31,82 32 37,00 37 1 8 3 7
LI L Bhutan 46,63 29 48,86 33 33,93 37 33,00 33 -4 -8 -4 -4
LI L Burkina Faso 46,68 30 46,78 29 31,15 30 29,67 29 1 0 1 -1
LI L Burundi 59,88 50 59,93 48 46,79 53 50,33 50 2 -3 0 -5
LI L Cambodia 52,32 42 53,16 41 31,93 33 38,67 40 1 9 2 8
LI Cameroon 33,08 6 33,38 6 20,34 7 6,33 6 0 -1 0 -1
L Cape Verde 57,92 47 58,17 45 42,43 48 46,67 46 2 -1 1 -3
LI L Central African Republic 50,80 39 52,81 40 40,90 45 41,33 41 -1 -6 -2 -5
LI L Chad 62,83 54 65,20 53 54,17 60 55,67 56 1 -6 -2 -7
LI L Comoros 63,60 55 66,05 56 49,66 55 55,33 55 -1 0 0 1
LI Congo,Rep of 49,60 35 49,85 35 32,52 35 35,00 35 0 0 0 0
LI Côte d'Ivoire 33,52 7 33,70 7 20,65 8 7,33 7 0 -1 0 -1
LI Dem. Peo's Rep.Korea 40,19 13 40,37 13 24,62 14 13,33 13 0 -1 0 -1
LI L Dem. Rep. of the Congo 42,62 20 42,72 20 26,43 18 19,33 20 0 2 0 2
L Djibouti 60,16 51 60,17 49 40,25 41 47,00 47 2 10 4 8
LI L Equatorial Guinea 70,71 63 71,05 63 51,25 57 61,00 61 0 6 2 6
LI L Eritrea 63,99 57 66,72 59 43,57 49 55,00 54 -2 8 3 10
LI L Ethiopia 39,32 12 39,81 12 23,55 11 11,67 12 0 1 0 1
LI L Gambia 55,68 43 55,71 42 40,33 42 42,33 42 1 1 1 0
LI Ghana 41,50 15 41,56 15 25,31 15 15,00 14 0 0 1 0
LI L Guinea 34,58 9 35,33 9 23,37 10 9,33 10 0 -1 -1 -1
LI L Guinea-Bissau 66,18 60 66,46 57 53,55 59 58,67 59 3 1 1 -2
LI L Haiti 56,81 44 58,76 46 46,63 52 47,33 48 -2 -8 -4 -6
LI India 19,06 1 19,06 1 10,27 1 1,00 1 0 0 0 0
LI Indonesia 24,84 3 24,84 3 13,22 2 2,67 2 0 1 1 1
LI Kenya 24,24 2 24,56 2 14,89 5 3,00 3 0 -3 -1 -3
L Kiribati 83,65 64 83,85 64 74,95 64 64,00 64 0 0 0 0
LI L Laos 57,87 46 57,88 44 41,30 47 45,67 44 2 -1 2 -3
LI L Lesotho 50,53 38 52,11 38 35,71 39 38,33 39 0 -1 -1 -1
LI L Liberia 67,95 61 68,43 60 61,08 63 61,33 62 1 -2 -1 -3
LI L Madagascar 41,57 16 41,61 16 26,64 19 17,00 16 0 -3 0 -3
LI L Malawi 48,83 34 49,23 34 37,66 40 36,00 36 0 -6 -2 -6
L Maldives 51,98 41 56,60 43 40,85 44 42,67 43 -2 -3 -2 -1
LI L Mali 42,63 21 43,72 23 32,84 36 26,67 27 -2 -15 -6 -13
LI L Mauritania 40,56 14 41,29 14 27,61 20 16,00 15 0 -6 -1 -6
LI Mongolia 46,72 31 47,71 31 31,39 31 31,00 31 0 0 0 0
LI L Mozambique 43,56 23 43,59 22 29,64 27 24,00 24 1 -4 -1 -5
LI L Myanmar 42,22 19 42,48 19 24,61 13 17,00 16 0 6 3 6
LI L Nepal 37,43 11 37,56 11 24,23 12 11,33 11 0 -1 0 -1
LI Nicaragua 43,89 24 43,94 24 28,07 22 23,33 22 0 2 2 2
LI L Niger 49,99 37 50,00 36 34,74 38 37,00 37 1 -1 0 -2
LI Nigeria 44,76 26 46,06 27 26,27 17 23,33 22 -1 9 4 10
LI Pakistan 25,73 4 25,93 5 13,48 3 4,00 4 -1 1 0 2
LI Papua New Guinea 44,15 25 44,52 25 29,17 24 24,67 25 0 1 0 1
LI L Rwanda 59,33 49 59,58 47 40,76 43 46,33 45 2 6 4 4
L Samoa 64,65 59 68,57 61 49,84 56 58,67 59 -2 3 0 5
LI L Sao Tome and Principe 58,15 48 65,36 55 43,81 50 51,00 52 -7 -2 -4 5
LI L Senegal 41,80 17 42,00 17 28,02 21 18,33 19 0 -4 -2 -4
LI L Sierra Leone 63,74 56 64,08 52 57,91 62 56,67 57 4 -6 -1 -10
LI L Solomon Islands 56,89 45 61,43 51 44,48 51 49,00 49 -6 -6 -4 0
LI L Somalia 68,40 62 69,24 62 54,27 61 61,67 63 0 1 -1 1
LI L Sudan 49,85 36 51,16 37 29,66 28 33,67 34 -1 8 2 9
LI L Tanzania, United Rep. of 34,12 8 34,26 8 21,60 9 8,33 8 0 -1 0 -1
LI L Timor-Leste 60,84 53 61,14 50 53,05 58 53,67 53 3 -5 0 -8
LI L Togo 45,81 27 45,88 26 29,42 25 26,00 26 1 2 1 1
L Tuvalu 91,85 65 93,33 65 93,29 65 65,00 65 0 0 0 0
LI L Uganda 47,42 32 47,67 30 29,45 26 29,33 28 2 6 4 4
L Vanuatu, Republic of 64,25 58 66,61 58 47,36 54 56,67 57 0 4 1 4
LI Viet Nam 35,74 10 36,95 10 17,16 6 8,67 9 0 4 1 4
LI L Yemen 42,11 18 42,11 18 25,80 16 17,33 18 0 2 0 2
LI L Zambia 46,19 28 46,48 28 32,32 34 30,00 30 0 -6 -2 -6
LI Zimbabwe 47,90 33 48,02 32 30,60 29 31,33 32 1 4 1 3
Averages
50 LDC's 53,33 38,20 54,44 38,18 39,36 38,52 38,30 38,28 1,30 3,96 1,56 4,02
15 other low income 36,99 15,67 37,36 15,73 22,53 14,60 15,33 15,07 0,20 1,87 0,73 1,93
65 49,56 33,00 50,50 33,00 35,48 33,00 33,00 32,92 1,05 3,48 1,37 3,54
Medians
50 LDC's 51,96 40,50 52,98 40,50 38,96 40,50 40,00 40,50 1,00 3,00 1,00 4,00
15 other low income 40,19 13,00 40,37 13,00 24,62 14,00 13,33 13,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
65 47,90 33,00 48,86 33,00 31,93 33,00 33,00 33,00 1,00 2,00 1,00 3,00
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Table 3: Average and median values of EVI for broad groups and regions, from the 2006 review of the list of the LDCs 
 
 
EVI, 2006 review Population, 2005 Remoteness  Export concentration shares of agriculture, etc. Specialisation % homeless Agricultural instability Natural Export instability exposure shock 
2003 or latest year 2003 or 2004 index 1990-2004 1979-2004 shock 1979-2004 index index EVI
(Main source: UNCTAD) index trade shock index
values Max-min Indice Max-min values Max-min values Max-min values logs Max-min values Max-min values Max-min
Least developed countries (50)
   average 15 187 782   46,49      0,692  73,57   0,548      52,63           32,62          53,42         53,02              2,20     -0,48 62,86   8,08        35,45      49,16      22,69    54,37   54,89      51,76      53,33      
   median 8 333 340     38,22      0,675  71,84   0,507      47,84           33,44          55,73         49,64              0,54     -0,61 61,42   7,16        30,62      46,98      17,74    46,05   52,80      49,46      51,96      
   
Low income EIT (8)
   average 13 118 982   38,49      0,529  53,67   0,388      33,87           21,24          35,41         34,64              1,05     -1,63 50,59   7,86        34,37      42,48      15,52    39,12   41,32      40,80      41,06      
   median 5 885 387     43,65      0,641  67,59   0,395      34,68           19,80          33,00         38,24              0,88     -0,18 66,08   6,90        29,19      46,91      12,11    28,48   44,02      36,48      43,49      
Other low income (15)
   average 122 947 746 22,95      0,659  69,51   0,360      30,20           21,38          35,64         32,92              1,36     -0,94 57,98   5,18        19,90      38,94      14,16    34,87   37,08      36,90      36,99      
   median 22 112 810   23,21      0,605  63,17   0,251      17,81           21,52          35,87         31,83              0,51     -0,68 60,74   3,73        12,08      37,90      13,84    33,86   38,49      37,77      40,19      
Least developed and other low income (65)
   average 40 055 466   41,06      0,684  72,64   0,504      47,45           30,03          49,31         48,38              2,01     -0,58 61,73   7,41        31,86      46,80      20,72    49,87   50,78      48,33      49,56      
   median 9 402 098     36,36      0,664  70,47   0,459      42,28           27,50          45,83         46,29              0,51     -0,67 60,83   6,48        26,92      44,95      16,09    40,90   49,76      46,03      47,90      
Developing countries excluding EIT (132)
   average 39 078 767   44,82      0,657  69,16   0,441      40,10           19,27          31,75         35,93              1,48     -1,49 52,05   7,65        32,62      42,34      16,89    39,61   48,68      40,97      44,83      
   median 7 376 119     40,10      0,658  69,72   0,400      35,25           14,71          24,52         34,29              0,41     -0,88 58,58   6,53        27,20      41,37      13,48    32,74   47,91      38,04      43,13      
Developing excluding EIT and LDC (82)
   average 53 646 441   43,80      0,636  66,47   0,376      32,46           11,13          18,54         25,50              1,04     -2,11 45,46   7,39        30,90      38,18      13,35    30,61   44,89      34,39      39,64      
   median 6 802 758     41,34      0,649  68,60   0,314      25,14           9,20            15,34         22,12              0,34     -1,09 56,30   5,88        23,66      39,27      11,58    26,81   41,36      32,40      39,10      
SIDS (33)
   average 1 499 803     80,93      0,672  71,52   0,476      44,11           15,66          25,70         34,90              2,30     -1,26 54,58   8,56        37,99      46,28      20,45    44,27   67,07      45,28      56,17      
   median 329 198        87,91      0,651  68,89   0,425      38,18           10,37          17,28         33,73              0,41     -0,89 58,51   8,47        37,67      50,10      14,06    34,55   70,24      42,74      56,49      
Landlocked developing (31) 
   average 12 201 110   39,61      0,764  80,97   0,455      41,73           27,78          46,30         44,01              1,15     -1,88 47,96   8,56        38,15      43,05      17,33    44,24   51,05      43,64      47,35      
   median 8 410 801     38,07      0,766  83,30   0,419      37,52           28,80          48,00         44,63              0,25     -1,40 53,02   7,76        33,86      43,69      14,93    37,27   52,33      40,56      46,68      
EIT low income (8)
   average 13 118 982   38,49      0,529  53,67   0,388      33,87           21,24          35,41         34,64              1,05     -1,63 50,59   7,86        34,37      42,48      15,52    39,12   41,32      40,80      41,06      
   median 5 885 387     43,65      0,641  67,59   0,395      34,68           19,80          33,00         38,24              0,88     -0,18 66,08   6,90        29,19      46,91      12,11    28,48   44,02      36,48      43,49      
African LDC's (34)
   average 13 415 629   42,58      0,688  72,89   0,589      57,51           34,27          55,72         56,62              1,00     -0,92 58,15   8,16        35,98      47,07      20,45    53,93   53,67      50,50      52,08      
   median 8 738 272     37,50      0,661  70,12   0,570      55,25           34,28          57,13         55,12              0,42     -0,87 58,66   7,16        30,62      45,88      17,74    46,05   51,01      48,72      50,26      
Other African countries (18)
   average 24 857 133   36,82      0,600  61,33   0,474      43,73           13,45          22,42         33,07              0,43     -2,55 40,77   7,26        31,15      35,96      13,95    34,21   42,01      35,09      38,55      
   median 14 665 695   29,62      0,619  64,88   0,419      37,54           11,27          18,78         32,53              0,12     -2,13 45,26   6,21        25,45      35,22      14,20    34,99   38,71      34,78      37,76      
All African countries (52)
   average 17 376 150   40,58      0,658  68,89   0,549      52,74           27,07          44,19         48,47              0,80     -1,49 52,13   7,85        34,31      43,22      18,20    47,10   49,63      45,16      47,40      
   median 9 575 515     36,08      0,646  68,31   0,528      50,32           24,40          40,67         46,97              0,30     -1,19 55,29   7,01        29,78      42,91      15,79    39,97   49,78      43,79      46,43      
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Table 4: A retrospective EVI from 1970, for main groups and regions, by decades and five year 
periods 
 
70-79 80-89 90-99 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 2000-
Developing countries Moy 5,55 5,19 4,69 5,17 5,57 5,52 4,49 4,45 4,15 3,49
Nbo (75) (86) (105) (77) (80) (88) (100) (107) (111) (114)
Sd 4,04 2,44 4,56 4,59 4,26 2,98 2,39 3,72 5,49 3,83
Median 4,39 4,47 3,96 3,50 4,31 5,10 3,98 3,52 2,79 2,58
LDCs Moy 5,61 5,62 6,03 5,31 6,55 6,24 4,95 5,03 5,83 3,93
Nbo (24) (26) (40) (24) (26) (27) (35) (41) (44) (45)
Sd 2,89 2,87 6,85 3,31 4,65 3,49 2,73 3,81 8,16 3,95
Median 4,77 4,60 4,21 3,92 5,00 5,39 4,19 4,22 3,36 2,79
Non LDCs Moy 5,52 5,01 3,87 5,10 5,09 5,20 4,24 4,10 3,05 3,20
Nbo (51) (60) (65) (53) (54) (61) (65) (66) (67) (69)
Sd 4,51 2,22 1,84 5,09 4,01 2,70 2,17 3,65 1,93 3,76
Median 3,99 4,47 3,50 3,24 3,70 5,10 3,57 3,06 2,62 2,48
SIDs Moy 6,22 5,98 4,22 6,09 7,11 6,72 4,50 4,15 3,38 3,14
Nbo (11) (18) (25) (11) (13) (19) (25) (25) (26) (27)
Sd 3,76 3,15 2,00 4,59 5,72 4,08 2,52 2,15 2,56 2,47
Median 4,55 4,91 3,98 3,93 4,58 6,03 3,42 3,37 3,01 2,79
Non SIDs Moy 5,43 4,99 4,83 5,01 5,27 5,19 4,48 4,55 4,39 3,60
Nbo (64) (68) (80) (66) (67) (69) (75) (82) (85) (87)
Sd 4,11 2,19 5,11 4,60 3,89 2,54 2,36 4,09 6,11 4,17
Median 4,36 4,47 3,80 3,34 4,31 4,90 4,11 3,53 2,76 2,48
LDCs non SIDs Moy 5,25 5,04 6,49 4,90 5,64 5,34 5,00 5,31 6,26 3,97
Nbo (22) (22) (31) (22) (22) (22) (27) (32) (35) (35)
Sd 2,13 2,12 7,63 2,36 3,07 2,31 2,65 4,11 8,96 4,07
Median 4,77 4,41 4,25 3,92 4,72 4,87 4,19 4,23 3,29 2,88
LICs Moy 5,74 5,27 5,65 4,98 5,75 5,72 4,42 4,62 5,54 3,72
Nbo (36) (37) (49) (36) (37) (37) (44) (50) (53) (53)
Sd 2,85 2,38 6,32 3,16 3,21 2,62 2,49 3,63 7,58 3,74
Median 4,95 4,77 4,16 3,88 4,76 5,39 4,12 3,58 3,29 2,71
Non LICs Moy 5,37 5,13 3,84 5,33 5,41 5,38 4,54 4,31 2,88 3,30
Nbo (39) (49) (56) (41) (43) (51) (56) (57) (58) (61)
Sd 4,93 2,50 1,71 5,58 5,02 3,24 2,33 3,83 1,53 3,93
Median 3,45 4,43 3,56 3,24 3,69 5,10 3,85 3,10 2,66 2,51
SIDs non LDCs Moy 5,47 5,16 4,10 5,26 5,13 5,47 4,36 4,22 2,97 2,75
Nbo (9) (14) (16) (9) (9) (14) (17) (16) (17) (17)
Sd 2,53 2,21 1,65 3,30 2,60 2,90 2,25 2,07 1,78 1,35
Median 4,55 4,35 3,87 3,93 4,19 5,17 3,42 3,57 2,62 2,96
SIDs LDCS Moy 9,60 8,82 4,43 9,84 11,57 10,21 4,79 4,03 4,16 3,81
Nbo (2) (4) (9) (2) (4) (5) (8) (9) (9) (10)
Sd 7,88 4,58 2,62 9,48 8,65 5,18 3,18 2,42 3,62 3,69
Median 9,60 8,67 4,09 9,84 9,45 10,14 3,78 3,23 3,38 2,78
LDCs / Non LDCs Wilcoxonn-z -1,27 -0,96 -1,57 -1,61 -2,00 -1,27 -1,20 -1,42 -1,81 -0,85
pvalue-z 0,203 0,335 0,116 0,108 0,046 0,205 0,229 0,157 0,071 0,396
LICs / Non LICs Wilcoxonn-z -2,07 -0,49 -1,36 -1,28 -1,78 -0,96 0,30 -0,28 -1,68 -0,41
pvalue-z 0,038 0,622 0,174 0,202 0,076 0,337 0,765 0,779 0,093 0,685
Wilcoxonn-z -1,13 -1,11 -0,45 -1,10 -1,32 -1,25 0,21 -0,58 0,11 -0,10
SIDs / Non SIDs pvalue-z 0,258 0,265 0,652 0,272 0,186 0,212 0,833 0,561 0,909 0,918
Wilcoxonn-z -0,38 -0,64 0,69 -0,29 -0,27 -0,78 0,92 0,50 0,89 0,43
SIDs / LDCs non SIDs pvalue-z 0,703 0,523 0,489 0,775 0,785 0,433 0,360 0,618 0,374 0,665
Wilcoxonn-z 0,94 1,70 0,17 0,47 1,54 2,04 0,00 -0,40 1,00 0,10
SIDs non LDCs / LDCs pvalue-z 0,346 0,089 0,865 0,637 0,123 0,042 1,000 0,692 0,319 0,920
Wilcoxonn-z 0,04 0,45 0,63 0,02 0,87 0,71 0,79 0,18 1,25 0,43
SIDs non LDCs/SIDs LDCspvalue-z 0,968 0,650 0,526 0,984 0,385 0,475 0,429 0,859 0,213 0,664
Decades Five Years
 
